






More Than Tolerance: 
Ethics for a Multicultural Society
Abstract
Contemporary multicultural societies for the most part frame themselves in terms of a pro-
cedural rather than substantive ethics, by emphasizing rightness rather than goodness, and 
elevate tolerance to key value. But this cannot of itself replace a substantive and motivating 
norm of the good life and can be experienced as a loss, disaffecting citizens. It will also fail 
to confront the limits of acceptable action, the unconditionality associated with the moral 
point of view. The classical tradition in ethics, proposing a norm of human flourishing, can 
be re-expressed to bring out this unconditionality. I point to the counter tradition of ethi-
cal reasoning in terms of proportionality, exampled in the case of war ethics, as useful and 
draw on an alternative concept of democracy in terms not of formal or substantive rights 






















In	 spite	 of	 the	 obvious	 and	 uncontroversial	 good	 points	 in	 this	 kind	 of	
progress,	I	want	to	argue	that	the	procedural	approach	is	in	the	final	analy-


























this,	 critically	 developed,	 that	 can	 serve	 to	 anchor	 its	 approach	 to	 religion	





















to	 this	 particular	moral	 tradition	might	 not	 find	 intuitively	 appealing).	But	




















































cize	 the	 government,	 for	 example.	The	 pro-
cedural	dimension	 to	 justice	 is	 largely	over-
looked,	and	along	with	that,	the	valuing	of	the	
attitude	of	tolerance.	The	idea	of	a	substantive	
concept	 of	 justice	 was	 firmly	 brought	 in	 by	
the	1996	Constitution	of	the	RSA,	entrench-









the	collection	Human Dignity and Bioethics,	





to	 determine	 what	 humiliation	 is	 independ-














move	away	from	a	substantive	public	ethic.	In	the	Handbook for Professional 
Ethics for Educators	(2002),	distributed	to	schools	throughout	the	provinces	
of	South	Africa,	the	authors	focus	on	the	idea	of	the	universality	of	human	
rights.	While	 trying	 to	 instil	 a	 sense	of	 professional	 ethics	 in	 teachers,	 the	
authors	of	the	Handbook	take	very	seriously	the	multicultural	context	of	our	
society	and	the	danger	of	moral	or	religious	absolutism.	It	is	argued	that	any	
ethical	 framework,	 religious	 or	 otherwise,	 from	 utilitarianism	 through	 to	
egoism,	from	Christianity	through	to	Buddhism,	is	compatible	with	following	
the	ethical	code	 for	educators	 (2002:	120).	The	principles	expressed	 in	 the	
code,	 articulating	basic	human	 rights,	 are	presented	 as	autonomous	 of	 any	
motivational	framework.	The	Handbook	 takes	 the	position	 that,	 in	a	multi-





giving	 identity,	 are	 in	 disarray	 (have	been	 for	 some	 time!)	 and	need	 to	 be	


















bringing	 to	 light	 the	extent	 to	which	our	human	existence	 is	 a	 shared	one,	
and	because	of	this	there	are	certain	boundary	conditions	to	the	exercise	of	




















































recall,	 as	 as	 Spaemann	 does	 (2002,	Ch	 14),	 Plato’s	 classic	 attempt,	 in	 the	
Gorgias,	 to	 refute	 the	argument	 that	moral	 rules	are	merely	social	conven-





haus.	 He	 writes	 that	 what	 mattered	 during	
Apartheid	was	“whether	 the	 legal	order	was	
committed	to	a	substantive	or	merely	formal	
conception	 of	 legality	 or	 the	 rule	 of	 law”	
(2011:	 235).	What	 was	 heartening	 was	 that	
there	 were	 indeed	 lawyers	 and	 judges	 who	
did	not	 accept	 that	“the	principle	of	 legality	
imposes	 requirements	 of	 form	 alone.”	 And	








revival	 in	 English-language	 philosophy	 of	
this	(reformulated)	classical	approach	to	eth-










































of	 the	 theory	of	utilitarianism	and	of	deontological	ethics,	and	 the	same	 is	
true	also	of	the	approach	we	are	considering	here,	using	the	idea	of	the	kind	
of	being	we	are	(our	place	in	nature	and	our	normatively	structured	sense	of	
identity,	more	or	 less	 reflected	 in	our	 traditions.)	The	Greek	Sophists,	 and	
also	Plato	and	Aristotle,	turned	to	the	concept	of	nature,	physis,	as	an	answer	
to	those	who,	discovering	the	wide	discrepancy	among	moral	rules	in	differ-
ent	 cultures,	 questioned	whether	 custom,	nomos,	 could	 have	 any	 critically	
judged	worth	for	the	individual.	Or	are	perhaps	customs	simply	conventions,	


























ing	 to	our	humanity.	Spaemann	 (2000:	viii)	notes	 that	 the	approach	which	




unconditionedness	 re-appears.	 This	 is	 because	 our	 choices	 can	 sometimes	
not	represent	what	we	really	are.	The	idea	of	our	“real”	wants	is	crucial	here.	
The	notions	 of	 “right”	 and	 “wrong”	have	 at	 least	 two	meanings.	 If	 action	











him,	 extreme	 cases.	 “Are	 you	 not	 ashamed,	
Socrates,	 to	 drag	 our	 discussion	 into	 such	




disturbed	or	 ill	 (and	 therefore	“unenviable”)	
would	 tend	 to	 be	 applied	 to,	 say,	 someone	
who	 claimed	 they	 enjoyed	 living	 in	 the	 ex-
treme	conditions	of	the	ghettos	or	concentra-
tion	 camps	 in	Nazi	Germany	 (we	 can	 think	
of	the	performance	of	Charlotte	Rampling	in	
Night Porter	 depicting	 someone	 seeming	 to	
enjoy	being	degraded.)
8
An	 alternative	 approach	 is	 suggested	 by	
Martha	Nussbaum	(1997),	namely	to	bypass	
particular	 conventions	 through	 adopting	 a	
Stoic	 cosmopolitanism.	 Seeing	 oneself	 as	 a	
“citizen	of	 the	world”	would	mean	 identify-









case	 requires	 the	 agent	 to	make	 a	 reasoned	
judgment	about	the	values	at	stake.	If	the	in-
junctions	 collected	under	 the	 rubric	of	what	
is	 “politically	 correct”	 (according	 to	 Nuss-






discerning	 what	 is	 truly	 worthwhile	 doing	
is	at	 the	same	 time	creatively	advancing	 the	
tradition.	 Without	 this	 creative	 engagement	
(the	need	for	which	we	have	mined	from	the	
classical	moral	tradition)	the	danger	is	an	un-










































this	goodness/rightness	distinction	can	 throw	 light	on	why,	 in	contemporary	
refection	on	the	ethics	of	war,	a	different	approach	to	the	usual	is	adopted.	
I	want	to	suggest	that	the	“justified	war”	approach	is	preferred	to	the	utilitar-
























































philosophical	 approach	 see	 Zaborowski,	 H.	
2001;	Madigan,	A.	1997;	Duhamel,	A.	1999.
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to	 them,	 in	 the	 minds	 of	 those	 perpetrating	
them,	shows,	as	commission	chairman	Bishop	
Tutu,	notes	“that	they	do	accept	that	the	use	











































































































zen	 (2002);	Deon	Rossouw	 (2002);	 also	 the	
SACE	 Handbook	 (2002),	 discussed	 below.	
Rossouw	 takes	 MacIntyre’s	 analysis	 of	 the	














































mitments	 that	 actually	motivate	citizens.	But	we	have	 suggested	 that	 there	
is	much	to	be	learnt	 in	constructing	standards	for	such	discussion	from	the	
classical	ethics	of	human	flourishing,	in	particular	as	unpacked	by	means	of	
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Više od tolerancije: etika za multikulturno društvo
Sažetak
Suvremena multikulturna društva velikim se dijelom okviruju u smislu proceduralne prije nego 
supstantivne etike, naglašavajući ispravnost umjesto dobrote, te uzdižu toleranciju kao ključnu 
vrijednost. No to ne može sâmo zamijeniti supstantivnu i motivacijsku normu dobroga života te 
se može iskusiti kao gubitak, otuđenje građana. Isto tako neće uspjeti suočiti se s granicama 
prihvatljivog djelovanja, neuvjetovanošću povezanom s moralnim gledištem. Klasična tradicija 
u etici, koja predlaže normu ljudskog blagostanja, može se ponovno izraziti kako bi iznijela na 
vidjelo ovu neuvjetovanost. Ukazat ću na korisnost suprotne tradicije etičkog rasuđivanja u vidu 
proporcionalnosti, primjerice u slučaju ratne etike, te razmotriti alternativni koncept demokra-




Mehr als Toleranz: Ethik für multikulturelle Gesellschaft
Zusammenfassung
Gegenwärtige multikulturelle Gesellschaften gestalten sich zumeist unter dem Aspekt der eher 
prozeduralen als materialen Ethik, indem sie die Richtigkeit anstelle der Güte herausheben, 
und werten die Toleranz zum Schlüsselwert auf. Dies per se vermag es immerhin nicht, die 
materiale und motivierende Norm des guten Lebens zu ersetzen, dagegen kann es als Verlust, 
als Bürgerentfremdung verspürt werden. Es versagt desgleichen in der Konfrontierung mit den 
Limits des akzeptablen Handelns, mit der moralitätsbetreffenden Bedingungslosigkeit. Die klas-
sische Gepflogenheit in der Ethik, welche einen Maßstab der Menschheitsblüte nahelegt, kann 
wieder dargetan werden, um auf diese Bedingungslosigkeit Nachdruck zu legen. Ich deute auf 
die Nützlichkeit einer Gegentradition der ethischen Erwägung hin, aus der Perspektive der 
Proportionalität, exempli causa in der Angelegenheit der Kriegsethik, und stelle ein alternatives 
Demokratieschema auf, nicht im Sinne der formalen bzw. substantiven Rechte, sondern von der 




Plus que la tolerance : l’éthique pour une société multiculturelle
Résumé
Les sociétés multiculturelles contemporaines construisent pour la plupart leur cadre en termes 
d’éthique procédurale plutôt qu’en termes d’éthique substantielle, en soulignant la justesse plu-
tôt que la bonté, et en élevant la tolérance au rang de valeur clé. Mais cela ne peut pas en soi-
même remplacer la norme substantielle et motivante de la vie bonne et peut être vécue comme 
une perte, la désaffection des citoyens. Cela ne parviendra pas non plus à mettre les limites à 
l’action acceptable, l’inconditionnalité associée au point de vue moral. La tradition classique 
dans l’éthique, qui propose une norme de l’épanouissement humain, peut être ré-exprimée afin 
de faire ressortir cette inconditionnalité. J’indique que la tradition opposée du raisonnement 
éthique en termes de proportionnalité, par exemple dans le cas de l’éthique de la guerre, est 
utile, et je fais appel à un concept alternatif de démocratie en termes non de droits formels ou 
substantiels mais d’une éthique de participation.
Mots-clés
éthique,	philosophie	classique	grecque,	justesse/bonté,	multiculturalisme,	tolérance,	Robert	Spaemann,	
inconditionnalité,	raisonnement	proportionaliste
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